Will Musharraf
Crackdown on Mullas before his US Visit
By B Raman
A
LITTLE more than two weeks before his scheduled departure for
the US for high-profile talks with President George W Bush at
Camp David, Pakistan's president Gen Pervez Musharraf finds himself
confronted with an embarrassing political deadlock, which does
not bode well for his self-projected image as the designer of
democracy in Pakistani colors.
The
coalition of six religious fundamentalist parties called the Mutahida
Majlis-e-Amal (MMA), with the support of the Pakistan Muslim League
(N) of Nawaz Sharif,the Pakistan People's Party Parliamentarians
(PPPP) of Benazir Bhutto and other smaller anti-military political
parties, has been waging a relentless battle against Musharraf's
continuing to function as "the olive green President",
wearing the two hats of the president of the Republic and the
chief of the army staff (COAS).
Another
objective of its battle is to force Musharraf seek re-election
as the president under the provisions laid down in the Constitution,
according to which the president is to be elected by a joint electoral
college consisting of the elected members of the federal parliament
and the provincial Legislative assemblies. Musharraf got himself
elected last year through a referendum, which was alleged to have
been blatantly rigged with the complicity of the election commission,
which has already ordered the destruction of all the records pertaining
to it.
The
opposition led by the MMA has also been challenging the various
constitutional amendments grouped together under a Legal Framework
Order (LFO), which Musharraf had got promulgated before the elections
of October 10 last. The LFO restores or vastly increases the powers
of the president in matters such as appointments of the chiefs
of the armed forces, judges of the federal and provincial high
courts, the head and members of the election commission, governors
of the provinces etc, dismissal of an elected government and the
elected assemblies and the constitution of a national security
council chaired by the president and not the prime minister. Through
the LFO, Musharraf has sought to give Pakistan a revised constitution
more akin to that of France than those of other parliamentary
democracies, which follow the British model.
The
government headed by Prime Minister Mir Zafarullah Khan Jamali,
which is a coalition dominated by the Musharraf-engineered PML-Q,
finds itself legislatively paralyzed due to the battle waged by
the MMA and its supporters in the federal parliament. Even though
it is more than six months since the elections to the National
Assembly were held, no formal legislative business could be transacted
so far due to the deadlock. The two Houses of parliament have
been functioning without even the formal inauguration of the session
by a presidential address outlining the policy goals of the government.
This is attributed to the fears of Musharraf that he might be
heckled if he appeared before a joint session for this purpose.
While
the federal government thus finds itself stymied in its efforts
to project a democratic image of Pakistan, the deadlock has not
come in the way of the administration of the country. The economy
continues to show sustained improvement under the stewardship
of Shaukat Aziz, the finance minister, who enjoys the confidence
of Musharraf and the international financial institutions. The
Government's response - positive, but not totally - to India's
overtures for re-opening the bilateral dialogue process has not
been inhibited by the murky political situation.
Till
now, Musharraf has had the army, the judiciary and the general
public behind him in his confrontation with the opposition parties
led by the MMA. Despite his vastly enhanced powers, his positive
international image and good vibrations with the US administration,
Musharraf has resisted any tendency to ride roughshod over any
dissenting views in the army. His authoritarianism is tempered
by his habit of seeking consensus in the army and the civilian
bureaucracy in favour of his views. His views ultimately prevail,
but are not seen as imposed on the military-civilian bureaucracy
from above.
Even
before he assumed power in October 1999, he was known as an officer,
who was responsive to the views of his colleagues and subordinates
in the military and sought their prior approval for his decisions.
He has maintained this practice. Moreover, all the present Corps
Commanders got their promotion as Lt Generals under his stewardship
and hence are assumed to owe a personal loyalty to him. For these
reasons, he should normally have no reasons to fear dissent in
the armed forces over the way he has been handling the political
crisis.
The
present judiciary was largely picked and chosen by him after he
assumed office and has been systematically softened by him through
various lollipops such as extended tenure through increase in
their retirement age etc. Many of them thus owe their career and
comforts to him and have found ways of standing by him whenever
his decisions have been challenged before the courts.
While
some sections of the elite (it is difficult to quantify them)
have backed the opposition's political struggle against him, the
general public of the country has by and large remained indifferent
till now to the campaign against him. The bitter memories of the
past style of governance of Sharif and Benazir remain strong.
The fact that both these leaders have chosen for themselves the
safety and comforts of political exile instead of facing the wrath
of the regime by returning to the country has not done any good
to their image.
The
visible signs of improvement in the economy marked by an increase
in tax collection and foreign exchange reserves, rise in exports,
a remarkably buoyant stock market, flood of external cash flow
etc and the improved international image of Pakistan under Musharraf
have had their impact on the attitude of the general public towards
him.
The
MMA is still able to draw large crowds into the streets to demonstrate
against his co-operation with the US against the Taliban and Osama
bin Laden's Al Qaeda and International Islamic Front (IIF), the
US invasion of Iraq etc, but its ability to draw similar crowds
to protest against his arbitrary political style and against his
continuing as the COAS is still to be proved though the MMA has
been threatening to take recourse to public agitation if its efforts
to reach a compromise through talks with the Government fail.
The
MMA owed its remarkable success in the October elections to Musharraf's
munificence. He ordered the withdrawal of the cases against many
of their candidates from the anti-terrorism courts so that they
were not disqualified by the election commission. He made the
election commission pass an order giving the certificates in Islamic
studies issued by the Madrassas the equivalence of an university
degree so that the newly-introduced electoral provision that only
graduates can contest elections did not come in the way of the
mullas and their proteges contesting the polls. He broke the PML
(N) and the PPPP, thereby weakening their ability to counter the
religious fundamentalist parties.
One
would have, therefore, expected that the mullas would have been
grateful to him and refrained from raising issues inconvenient
to him. Instead, they have been relentlessly challenging his self-assumed
political supremacy and seeking to reduce his powers. Before October
last, all religious fundamentalist parties _ and particularly
the Jamaat-e-Islami (JEI) of Qazi Hussain Ahmed _ were viewed
as the stooges of the army, amenable to its pressure. The Inter-Services
Intelligence (ISI) and the COAS never had difficulty in the past
in calling the mullas to order, except on rare occasions. When
Qazi Hussain Ahmed strongly opposed Musharraf's visit to India
for the Agra summit in 2001, one courtesy call on him by Lt Gen
Ehsanul Haq, the present Director-General of the ISI who was then
the Corps Commander at Peshawar, was sufficient to make the Qazi
relent in his opposition.
Ehsanul
Haq, who is an old personal and family friend of the Qazi, and
his senior officers in the ISI have repeatedly failed since October
last in their efforts to make the Qazi and other leaders of the
MMA see reason. The ISI and the Intelligence Bureau (IB) have
not so far been able to engineer a split in the opposition ranks.
The MMA gives the impression of being prepared to face the risk
of a dissolution of the National Assembly and the provincial Assemblies
of the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) and Balochistan and
fresh elections in which, without the bounties of Musharraf, it
may not do as well as it did in October.
The
questions which inevitably arise in one's mind are: What explains
the unity and seeming confidence of the religious opposition?
Are there elements not only in the military-intelligence establishment,
but also in the scientific circles associated with Pakistan's
nuclear and missile capability, which, while openly supporting
Musharraf, have been covertly instigating the MMA not to relent?
If so, who are these elements? Is it possible to quantify their
strength? Data presently available do not permit convincing answers
to these questions.
However,
one has to note reports of Musharraf's pro-US policies causing
unhappiness not only in the general public, but also in some sections
of the armed forces and the scientific community. There are reportedly
elements, which are yet to reconcile themselves to some of his
actions such as assisting the US in its efforts to destroy the
Taliban, giving the US intelligence agencies a free run of the
country, subjecting renowned scientists, doctors and other professionals
to the humiliation of detention and interrogation just because
of the suspicion of the US intelligence of their having possible
links with Al Qaeda, rendering Dr. A.Q.Khan, the so-called father
of Pakistan's atomic bomb, a virtual non-person by removing him,
reportedly under US pressure, from all positions of executive
power in the scientific field and starting a campaign to play
down his role in the development of Pakistan's military nuclear
capability etc.
There
are continuing reports of unease in the army and the Foreign Office
over his covert intelligence co-operation with the US against
Iran. However, there are at present no indicators to suggest that
such pockets of unhappiness of undetermined strength could create
serious dissensions in the establishment against him.
The
NWFP, which is now ruled by the MMA, and Balochistan, which is
ruled by the MMA and PML(QA) in coalition, have been adding to
the headaches and embarrassment of Musharraf. The MMA Government
in the NWFP has not only brazenly given sanctuary and protection
to the survivors of Al Qaeda and Taliban, but has also been trying
to talibanise the province by setting up a department of virtue
and vice and by having a law enacted for the enforcement of the
Islamic Sharia laws in the province.
In
Balochistan, there has been a deterioration in the law and order
situation since October, with at least three reported explosions
disrupting oil and gas supplies through pipelines to the industries
and other consumers of Punjab and Sindh. A public agitation against
the Chinese-assisted Gwadar port development project has been
gathering momentum. The Balochi nationalists have been critical
of the induction of a large number of Punjabis and Pashtuns into
the province to work in this project.
Musharraf's
personal and political gains hitherto by positioning himself as
the frontline ally of the US in the war against terrorism would
stand in danger of being reduced, if not wiped out, if he is not
able to bring the MMA and the administration controlled by it
in the NWFP to order. The specter of the resurgence of the Taliban
and Al Qaeda from the fertile soil of the NWFP and Balochistan
would increasingly haunt the US and the rest of the international
community if the alarming developments in the NWFP are not arrested
and reversed.
There
are some indications that Musharraf might already be contemplating
some action. He has reportedly initiated some action against terrorist
organizations, which are close to the constituents of the MMA.
Examples are the reported action against the Hizbul Mujahideen
(HM) of Kashmir, which is an appendage of the JEI, and the Harkat-ul-Mujahideen
(HUM) and the Jaish-e-Mohammad (JEM), which are close to the Jamiat-ul-Ulema
Islam (JUI) of Maulana Fazlur Rahman. At the same time, he has
avoided action against the Lashkar-e-Taiba (LET), which has no
association with any of the constituents of the MMA, so that he
does not lose the services of this organization, the largest of
the Pakistani terrorist organizations, in his proxy war against
India.
The
heads of the local administrative councils of the NWFP called
Nazims have collectively resigned reportedly at his instigation
on the ground that the provincial government has been interfering
in their functioning, which could be projected by him as a legitimate
ground for proclaiming the break-down of the constitution in the
province. It has been reported that the Federal Government has
unilaterally, without the concurrence of the provincial government,
ordered the transfer of the Chief Secretary and the Inspector-General
of Police of the province.
The
matters seem to be moving towards an intensification of the confrontation
and the ultimate denouement may come before his visit to the US.
He would like to go there with his seeming strength and following
in the eyes of the US unimpaired and as a leader totally in command
of the military and of the situation in the country whose value
as a stalwart ally remains undiminished.
Will
he wield the big stick against the religious fundamentalist parties
and, if he did, what will be the impact in the country? The indications
till now are that if he did so, he might be able to get away with
it just as he got away with his volte face in Afghanistan in October,
2001, when warnings of a public upsurge against him proved to
be wrong.
The
writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt
of India, New Delhi, and, currently, Director, Institute For Topical
Studies, Chennai, and Convener, Advisory Committee, Observer Research
Foundation, Chennai Chapter E-Mail: corde@vsnl.com. - Courtesy
Rediff.com
