A
river flowing in Kashmir
New Book
Says Water War Between Pakistan and Kashmir Inevitable in Future
Special
SAT Report
WASHINGTON,
March 11: India is not likely to consider abrogation of the Indus
Basin Waters Treaty with Pakistan, even in the event of any future
war but since Pakistan’s primary interest in Kashmir is
to secure its water resources, a water war between Kashmir and
Pakistan is inevitable in the future, a new book on Indo-Pakistan
relations coming out later this month says.
Published
by the Strategic Foresight Group of the International Center for
Peace Initiatives in Mumbai, the book “The Final Settlement”
deals with the issue of water between India and Pakistan in detail
and says Pakistan’s interest is in conflict with the people
of Kashmir on both sides of the Line of Control.
"A
conflict over land between the people of Kashmir and the government
of India will soon become a thing of the past. On the other hand,
a water war between Kashmir and Pakistan is inevitable in the
future," it observes.
It
says Kashmir on the Pakistani side of the Line of Control is predominantly
agriculture-based, depending on farming, livestock and related
activities. Though this region is well endowed with water resources,
it is marginally irrigated. Worse, hardly any development projects
have been envisaged. Apart from lack of development, the province
also suffers from manipulations. Its resources are tapped, but
the region is not duly compensated.
The
Mangla dam, constructed in Mirpur has revolutionized agriculture
in Punjab, but at the cost of Kashmir’s deprivation. The
Mangla dam, a major asset to the region, irrigates the canals
in Punjab and also generates electricity. This dam supplies 20
per cent of the hydroelectricity needs of Pakistan. However, till
early 2003, the province had not received any royalty for the
electricity generated from Mangla dam. NWFP, however, has been
receiving due compensation for the electricity generated from
its Tarbela dam.
In
late 2002, during General Musharraf’s regime, it was decided
to raise the height of Mangla dam by another 30 feet to 1,264
feet. This issue had long been under dispute due to objections
from Kashmir. It was feared that by raising the dam, around 44,000
persons and 8,000 households in Kashmir would be displaced, and
the district of Mirpur would be submerged.
Following
the federal government’s decision, Kashmiris organized several
protests. Though the water authorities assured building a new
city adjacent to Mirpur for the project-affected people, the locals
are not inclined to trust the authorities and almost all the political
parties in the province opposed to the project.
To
appease the government in Kashmir, Pakistan decided to pay royalty
to the province for the electricity generated from Mangla dam.
It was also decided to charge domestic consumer electricity rates,
as against the prevailing bulk rates, which are considerably higher.
Whilst
the debate was on between WAPDA and the Kashmir government over
the issue of tariffs and royalty, the Pakistan government proposed
to bring the Mangla dam territory under the federal jurisdiction,
which would have deprived Kashmir of its constitutional rights
to claim net profits from Mangla Dam power station and fishing
in the lake.
However,
this proposal did not materialize and finally, by end-June 2003,
Kashmir and WAPDA managed to reach a compromise over the issue
based on receiving a royalty of 50 paise per unit of electricity
generated, more compensation for the people displaced and a reduction
in electricity tariffs. Though the government accepted the package,
the people of the province did not receive this proposal well,
and agitations against the project continued. By late 2004, the
agitations slowed down temporarily, and Pakistan government was
pumping in funds to aid various development projects in the region.
The lull in protests can be partially explained, as the construction
has not yet started. The Pakistani authorities fear protests to
resurface once construction of the dam commences.
General
Musharraf while inaugurating the Mangla dam extension project
stated: “The raising of Mangla dam project will first be
benefiting Punjab, Sindh, NWFP, Balochistan and would then accrue
benefits for Azad Kashmir.” This clearly reflects Pakistan’s
policy towards Kashmir — an instrument for the development
of its provinces, especially Punjab. Kashmir is needed for developing
water and hydropower projects that will ensure reliable supply
to the provinces in Pakistan. But at the same time, Kashmir’s
own development needs are being neglected.
The
Mangla dam project and the royalty earmarked encouraged the Kashmir
(Pakistan) government to demand a share in the National Finance
Commission allocations and also in the Public Sector Development
Program. Kashmir (Pakistan) has never been granted the status
of a province of Pakistan. The demands for fiscal resources and
royalties reflect the Kashmiri people’s aspiration to not
remain a mere surrogate to Pakistan’s interests.
Punjab
has always claimed the Mangla Dam to be its exclusive compensation
for the three eastern rivers ceded to India under the Indus Waters
Treaty. It is on account of provisions of the same treaty that
Pakistan has a direct conflict of interest with Kashmiris on the
Indian side.
Indus
Waters Treaty of 1960 divided the Basin between India and Pakistan.
As per Article III of the Treaty, India is under obligation to
let flow the waters of western rivers to Pakistan. India can only
use these waters for household and agricultural purpose. For instance,
the new areas developed by withdrawals from river flows cannot
exceed 120,000 hectares. The treaty also puts a restriction of
3.6 MAF of storage capacity on the western rivers.
A
major achievement of the treaty was to end the decade-long bitter
controversy since partition. It opened the way for large development
works in the basin in both countries. The post-treaty period led
to an agricultural boom in both the countries, leading to higher
levels of production, acreage, yield and rapid growth.
The
treaty assured Pakistan, permanent water supply for its canal
system. The principal benefits were:
-
It helped Pakistan gain independence from India for ensuring its
supplies by binding the latter to a formal international treaty.
- The treaty helped regulate the flows of the Indus and its tributaries.
About 80 per cent of the total water is produced during the monsoon
period — July to September. Storage projects undertaken
due to the treaty ensure water availability during winters and
enhanced canal diversions.
- It helped to revolutionize agriculture.
The
negative outcome for Pakistan was the loss of eastern rivers,
and with this, land surrounding these rivers largely irrigated
by traditional methods was adversely affected. However, this loss
was compensated by the construction of storage reservoirs, canals
and diversions. The other drawback was the rise in inter-provincial
discord, especially in recent years, due to reduced flows in the
Indus.
The
major benefits that accrued from the treaty were:
-
The treaty enabled India to harness the eastern rivers to its
benefit. It helped in diverting waters to arid areas like Rajasthan
and develop irrigation facilities.
- India could also build run-of-the-river hydroelectric plants
on the western rivers and flood control storage facilities, though
no storage facilities have been built so far.
The
losses to India were:
-
Ceding western rivers to Pakistan hampered growth of Jammu &
Kashmir, as water resources in the state could not be harnessed
(as discussed later).
- Increased differences amongst basin states as they began contending
higher allocation of water.
- Absence of an exit clause in the treaty shut India’s options,
though Article XII of the treaty provides for a modification of
the treaty.
Pakistan’s
awareness of its vulnerability to its upstream neighbor for economic
viability had grown during the period of formulating the treaty.
Furthermore, its justification for acquiring the Kashmir valley
also found credence with the signing of the treaty.
The
treaty has thus far safeguarded Pakistan’s water requirements.
It has faithfully served both the countries as a means of forestalling
water-related disputes. And despite being the upper riparian state,
India has never used it as a ‘black mailing’ tool
in spite of two major wars and constant skirmishes.
Post-treaty,
after 45 years, Pakistan can now argue that by submitting to man-made
reservoir water, which has inherent complications, Pakistan has
accepted an unjust principle of replacing perennial stream water.
But it has to be borne in mind that had it not been for the treaty,
Pakistan would have been forced to remain in eternal conflict
with its neighbor Pakistan still has a solution in hand by improving
the management of water resources and developing new projects,
though it involves huge capital outlay.
India,
on its part, has never used the treaty as a bargaining lever to
restrain Pakistan from providing support to Jihad-e-Kashmir. Nevertheless,
there is bound to be an eternal sense of insecurity in Pakistan’s
mind given that any call on India’s part to change the treaty
can jeopardize Pakistan’s water supply situation. If the
treaty is revoked, Pakistan stands to lose its lifeline.
In
the long-term, the Indus Waters Treaty has favored Pakistan. Assessing
the present water situation, it is evident that India has had
much to lose while Pakistan has been insulated from water-related
adversities. For India, abrogating the treaty is an extreme step,
which may be taken under coercive circumstances. On the other
hand, given the bounty that the treaty has bestowed on Pakistan,
the country might not entertain even the proposition of renegotiating
the treaty.
The
Indus Waters Treaty would subsist till such time that:
-
India demands an irrevocable renegotiation of the treaty, for
reasons including, inter alia, water shortage
- The political status of Kashmir changes drastically
- India decides to abrogate the treaty — an extreme step
in retaliation to cross-border terrorism.
If
the treaty subsists, northern India would eventually reach a point
where meeting growing water requirements would become difficult.
International laws do not permit linking one river basin to another.
India then might be compelled to tap the rivers given away to
Pakistan, especially the Chenab. Treaty-bound, India might fail
in fostering socio-economic growth in northern states like Jammu
& Kashmir and Punjab.
The
World Bank had envisioned that mutual trust would finally bind
the two countries to the treaty. Instead, the two countries have
chosen the path of hostility.
The
treaty has engendered a vicious cycle. Lack of trust between India
and Pakistan forced the bifurcation of the Indus River Basin.
As the gap between water availability and requirements widen in
Pakistan, its desire to intensify jihadi operations will grow.
Agricultural development will be affected, which in turn will
produce a stratum of unemployed youth willing to service terrorist
groups. This in turn would aggravate the mistrust and hostility
between the two countries. This vicious cycle of depleting resources
spawning unemployment and fueling terrorism is feared to intensify
in the near future.
Jammu & Kashmir in India has been the foremost loser as a
result of this treaty as all the rivers surrendered to Pakistan
were the major water resources for the state. Due to restrictions
imposed on tapping of water resources, in conjunction with faltering
policies of successive state governments, Jammu & Kashmir
has been unable to grow to the optimum potential of its agriculture
and electricity sectors.
The
limitations imposed by the Indus Waters Treaty that affect Jammu
& Kashmir are:
?
The Treaty permits building storage aggregating 3.6 MAF on the
three rivers of the Indus, Jhelum and Chenab.
? Of the 3.6 MAF water storage capacities, 1.6 MAF is for hydropower,
0.75 MAF for flood moderation and 1.25 MAF for general storage
for non-consumptive uses including power generation.
? It permits additional irrigation of just 1.21 lakh hectares
from the Effective Date, 1 April 1960.
Hydroelectricity
potential in the state has been estimated to be around 15,000
MW, of which only 10 per cent has been harnessed so far. Currently,
projects worth 1,600 MW are in various stages of development.
Of the existing installed capacity in the state of 1,473 MW (state
and central sector), 99 per cent is from hydel plants. There is
little scope for any other forms of power generation, particularly
thermal, in the state since there are not many feasible sites
for such plants and the state’s difficult topographical
condition makes transportation of raw material impracticable.
Moreover,
all the power projects currently under construction in the state
have become controversial due to continuous interference of Pakistan
on the pretext of the treaty. The projects end up having long
gestation periods and short working life span.
Abrogating
the Indus Waters Treaty would provide greater benefits and open
up several avenues for unrestrained development of the state of
Jammu & Kashmir. It can:
?
Improve hydroelectricity sector’s potential as storage facilities
could be developed
? Pave the way for industrialization of the state
? Improve irrigation facilities which in turn would boost agricultural
growth
? Give rise to employment opportunities, which will indirectly
keep a check on external interference in state affairs
? Help attract private investments, propelling the state’s
position on India’s investment map.
The
opportunity to tap the Jhelum and Chenab Rivers would provide
windfall gains not only to Jammu & Kashmir, but also to the
neighboring states of Punjab, Rajasthan and Haryana. The three
states tend to be in conflict over the sharing of waters. The
addition of Chenab and Jhelum would secure water availability
for these states.
The
Indus Waters Treaty casts unilateral responsibility on India for
compliance. It is an obligation that necessarily falls on all
upper riparian states. Abrogation would not be defensible on any
understanding of the international water laws or the international
humanitarian laws. Further, abrogation will necessarily have to
be followed by an engineering feat that would greatly strain the
Indian economy.
In
any case, legally speaking, it is virtually impossible for India
to abrogate the treaty. Article XII (4) states that “provisions
of this treaty shall continue in force until terminated by a duly
ratified treaty concluded for that purpose between the two Governments.”
The treaty does not provide an exit clause for India per se.
Article
54 of Protocol I (1977) to the Geneva Convention (1949) prohibits
any measures that could result in the starvation of people. It
specifically refers to water resources and irrigation works.
Abrogation
is bound to incite reactions from the World Bank and the countries
that were party to the treaty and have provided funds. The countries,
including Australia, Canada, Germany, New Zealand, Britain and
the US, are also India’s major export destinations.
India
is aware of the implications of abrogation of the treaty. Therefore,
despite growing protests from the Kashmiri people, no policy maker
in New Delhi is ever likely to even contemplate this move. The
act of abrogation on the part of India could cause insecurity
among the other countries that are lower riparian to India. India’s
relations with its neighbors would also be affected, as India
also has water treaties with Nepal and Bangladesh.
The
dominant political thought in India is to have civilized relations
with neighbors, despite all odds. Therefore, India did not seek
unilateral abrogation of the treaty in the wars of 1965, 1971
and 1999; therefore, India is not likely to consider abrogation
in the event of any future war as well.
