Musharraf
Convinced Chenab Formula is the Only Acceptable Solution of Kashmir
By
Shaheen Sehbai
WASHINGTON,
March 10: Pakistan Army Chief General Pervez Musharraf is fully
convinced that the so called “Chenab Formula” is the
only acceptable solution to the Kashmir dispute, a new book published
by a leading Indian think-tank has revealed.
Titled
“The Final Settlement” and published by the
Strategic Foresight Group of the Mumbai-based International Center
for Peace Initiatives (ICPI), the book has produced what appears
to be insider information on how General Musharraf used his position
to force a solution which the book concedes would have been detrimental
to Pakistan, as a major source of water, the Chenab, would have
gone to India.
Not
written under any single author’s name, “The Final
Settlement” covers the Indo-Pakistan relations under
the thematic titles of Fire, Water and Earth. It claims it “draws
from the unique insight gathered over a decade of Track-II diplomacy,
input provided by Pakistani scholars on the condition of anonymity
and close monitoring of India-Pakistan relations on a daily basis.”
“It
exposes many dimensions of the bilateral relations hitherto unspoken.
It unravels layers of sub-continental mind sets to reveal the
core,” its introduction on the back cover says.
But
details of what happened in the last few months of Nawaz Sharif
Government and the role played by General Musharraf are newsy
and revealing. It claims Pervez Musharraf, in 1990 a bright and
ambitious Pakistani Brigadier at the Royal College of Defence
Studies in London, first linked the Indo-Pakistan conflict to
the rivers of Jammu and Kashmir in a paper he wrote for his one
year course. “The Brigadier was suggesting that the rivers
hold the key to the future conflict.”
The
book discloses that Nawaz Sharif sent a secret envoy to New Delhi
in 1999 to propose to the Vajpayee Government a solution on the
basis of river waters.
“Soon
after General Pervez Musharraf’s elevation, Prime Minister
Nawaz Sharif opened a track-two channel with the Government of
India. The main thrust of the Pakistani proposal, mooted in early
1999, was that rivers should be used as the basis for resolving
conflicts between India and Pakistan, including the issue of Jammu
& Kashmir. It advocated using Chenab River as the border.
The special envoy of Pakistani Prime Minister, made this proposal
to his Indian interlocutor on March 29, 1999 in New Delhi.
“His
visit to New Delhi was a secret known only to the Prime Minister
of Pakistan. By a curious coincidence, on the same day when the
envoy was in New Delhi, General Musharraf summoned Prime Minister
Nawaz Sharif for a discussion at General Head Quarters. The General
concluded that the only solution acceptable to Pakistan, to settle
its conflicts with India, was the Chenab Formula. The envoy returned
to Islamabad on April 1, 1999, oblivious of the meeting that had
taken place between the army chief and the Prime Minister.
“On
the following day, the envoy was taken to the General Head Quarters
for consultations with General Musharraf. This meeting was meant
to last for 30 minutes. It went on for 3 hours, from 8 pm to 11
pm. Besides General Musharraf and the envoy, only the head of
ISI was present in the room. The meeting concluded that the Chenab
Formula should be the basis of discussion with India to resolve
the Kashmir conflict.”
These
revelations are made in Chapter 6 of the book titled “The
Secret”. In Chapter 9 the book describes the Chenab Formula
as follows: “As per this formula, the city of Jammu and
some districts of Jammu province would go to India, while the
city of Srinagar and most parts of the Kashmir valley as well
as parts of Jammu region would be transferred to Pakistan. This
division would be based on the flow of the Chenab, but it would
to some extent coincide with religious demography.
“Why
is then Pakistan interested in the Chenab formula that includes
parts of Jammu? With a small twist to this proposal, consider
the hypothetical situation, as suggested by many experts, of only
Kashmir being a part of Pakistan, and entire Jammu province and
Ladakh under India. One evident outcome of such an arrangement
would be the dissolving of the Indus Waters Treaty, as the political
status of Kashmir would change. The distribution of water resources
would be altered. Pakistan would then have complete control over
only the Indus, Jhelum, and some of their tributaries. The Chenab,
Ravi, Beas and Sutlej rivers would fall under India’s jurisdiction.“
Following are excerpts of Chapter 6: “In 1990, a bright
and ambitious Pakistani brigadier at the Royal College of Defence
Studies in London was asked to prepare a dissertation as part
of his one-year training program. In September of that year, he
presented his dissertation with the rather lengthy title: The
Arms Race in the Indo-Pakistan Subcontinent, Conflicts with the
Pressing Requirements of Socio-economic Development. What are
its Causes and Implications? Is there a Remedy? The paper provided
a new analytical framework to define the security paradigm in
South Asia. Despite its rather lengthy and cumbersome title, the
paper was clear in its diagnosis of the South Asian security situation.
The brigadier argued that there were three core issues in the
region. One was the divide between the Hindu and Muslim mind set.
Another was the issue of Jammu & Kashmir, which was known
to the international community. The third issue was about the
distribution of the Indus Rivers between India and Pakistan. The
brigadier concluded: “This issue (Indus Waters) has the
germs of future conflict."
The
argument differed from the public stance taken by the Pakistani
government in the last fifty years. Successive Pakistani governments
still insist that Jammu & Kashmir is the unfinished business
of partition. As a Muslim majority state, it should belong to
Pakistan. India has argued that it belongs to India on the basis
of instrument of accession signed by Maharaja Hari Singh, then
ruler of the state, and the wish expressed by Shaikh Abdullah,
leader of the people’s movement. The public debate has always
focused on issues of terrorism, human rights and the legality
of accession. It has never linked the conflict to the rivers of
Jammu & Kashmir. The brigadier was suggesting that the rivers
hold the key to the future conflict.
The
brigadier returned to Pakistan to briskly climb the ladder of
the army ranks. In 1998, he replaced General Jehangir Karamat
as the Chief of Army Staff.
Soon
after General Pervez Musharraf’s elevation, Prime Minister
Nawaz Sharif opened a track-two channel with the Government of
India. The main thrust of the Pakistani proposal, mooted in early
1999, was that rivers should be used as the basis for resolving
conflicts between India and Pakistan, including the issue of Jammu
& Kashmir. It advocated using Chenab River as the border.
The special envoy of Pakistani Prime Minister, made this proposal
to his Indian interlocutor on March 29, 1999 in New Delhi.
His
visit to New Delhi was a secret known only to the Prime Minister
of Pakistan. By a curious coincidence, on the same day when the
envoy was in New Delhi, General Musharraf summoned Prime Minister
Nawaz Sharif for a discussion at General Head Quarters. The General
concluded that the only solution acceptable to Pakistan, to settle
its conflicts with India, was the Chenab Formula. The envoy returned
to Islamabad on April 1, 1999, oblivious of the meeting that had
taken place between the army chief and the Prime Minister.
On
the following day, the envoy was taken to the General Head Quarters
for consultations with General Musharraf. This meeting was meant
to last for 30 minutes. It went on for 3 hours, from 8 pm to 11
pm. Besides General Musharraf and the envoy, only the head of
ISI was present in the room. The meeting concluded that the Chenab
Formula should be the basis of discussion with India to resolve
the Kashmir conflict.
In
October 1999, General Pervez Musharraf staged a coup against the
elected government. He declared himself the Chief Executive. Western
donors, especially the US, suspended cash flows to Pakistan.
In
November 1999, on a cool afternoon in New York, a Pakistani head
of an international political organization, with very strong network
in the Pakistani army and political parties, met a senior ICPI
functionary. The meeting took place at the Manhattan office of
the political organization, a few blocks away from the UN office.
The eminent Pakistani cited that finding a permanent solution
to the India-Pakistan conflict would depend on ensuring Pakistan’s
water security beyond the Indus Waters Treaty of 1960. Perhaps,
Chenab River could be the border. Perhaps, some other formula
could be worked out but the fundamental determinant should be
water. There was no mention of self-determination of the Kashmiri
people.
The
following week, the ICPI functionary was invited by a top Pakistani
lobbyist, known for his strong network in the General Head Quarters
in Rawalpindi, to dinner in a suburb of Washington DC. Once the
formalities of the welcome drinks were over and before the dinner
was served, the Pakistani lobbyist said that he had an idea for
resolving the India-Pakistan conflict for good. A detailed proposal
would need to be worked out by experts but its basis must be face-saving
for both the countries, while the substance must ensure water
security for Pakistan from the rivers of Kashmir.
In
December 2001, when terrorists attacked the Indian Parliament,
India blamed Pakistan and withdrew its High Commissioner, in protest.
On the very next day, a high profile seminar was organized in
Lahore on how to respond to the possibility of India using water
as a weapon against Pakistan. New Delhi had not even alluded to
water. It had snapped rail, road and air links but there was no
reference to water. In Rawalpindi, Lahore and Karachi, there was
little regret about the breaking down of rail, road and air links
— the greatest apprehension was water. At a seminar in Karachi
in the last week of December 2001, attended by ICPI, the only
occasion when tensions rose, was when someone alleged that the
Indian government had plans to use the water weapon. A participant
warned that any conflict over water would lead to Pakistan using
nuclear weapons on a first strike basis against India.
A
month and half later, on February 8, 2002, the editorial of Jang,
a moderate Urdu daily, said that Pakistan’s water scarcity
could threaten relations between provinces and lead to a nuclear
war against India. Since then, a lively debate has ensued in the
Pakistani press, which continues till date with the President,
Prime Minister, senior army officers and leaders of various Kashmiri
groups offering their views underlining the centrality of water
in India-Pakistan relations.
For
instance, in June 2002, Syed Salahuddin, chairman of the United
Jihad Council, entered the debate. UJC is an umbrella organization
responsible for coordinating the activities – known as liberation
movements in Pakistan – of all jihadi groups. Syed Salahuddin
is also the leader of Hizbul Mujahideen — a member of UJC
— that has claimed responsibility for many acts of violence
in Jammu & Kashmir. Salahuddin was quoted in Ausaf
on June 18, 2002: “Kashmir is the source from where all
of Pakistan’s water resources originate. If Pakistan loses
its battle against India, it will become a desert.” Since
then in most public meetings that Salahuddin has addressed, he
has emphasized that Kashmiri freedom fighters were actually fighting
for Pakistan to enable it to gain control over Kashmir’s
rivers.
A
few months later, Sardar Mohammad Anwar Khan, President of Kashmir
under Pakistani control, known as Azad Kashmir in Pakistan and
Pakistan Occupied Kashmir in India, joined the debate. He was
quoted in most Urdu newspapers of October 21, 2002, saying: “Pakistanis
who believe that they can survive without Kashmir are wrong. The
Pakistani economy is dependent on agriculture and hence on water,
and therefore on Kashmir.”
Two
weeks later, he explained in a public forum: “Kashmiris
are fighting for the security, strength and prosperity of Pakistan.
Building dams in Kashmir can irrigate Punjab and Sindh. Kashmir
is important as Pakistan’s water resources originate in
Kashmir. Even peace between Punjab and Sindh depends on water,
and therefore on Kashmir.”
Sardar
Sikandar Hayat, Prime Minister of Kashmir under Pakistani control,
said in a seminar on March 6, 2003: “Without the rivers
of Kashmir, Pakistan will become a desert. The freedom fighters
of Kashmir are in reality fighting for Pakistan’s water
security and have prevented India from constructing a dam on the
Wular barrage.”
Finally,
on March 27, 2003, a senior officer of the Pakistan army, Lt General
Zarar Azim, the then Corps Commander of Lahore, was quoted in
Khabrain, a newspaper known for its proximity to ISI, saying:
“Kashmir is our lifeline and its importance increases in
view of our water security.”
Immediately
after the announcement of peace initiatives by India and Pakistan
in mid-2003, Sardar Sikander Hayat began advocating the Chenab
Formula for resolving the Kashmir dispute. He argued that an autonomous
Kashmir was not acceptable as it would be difficult to safeguard
the freedom acquired. However, this suggestion evoked very strong
criticism from all political and jihadi leaders of Pakistan as
it meant bifurcation of Kashmir. Most leaders wanted him to quit
as Prime Minister for having advocated such a formula. The jihadi
leaders were clear they wanted a united Kashmir.
Little
known is the fact that as per the Kashmir (Pakistan) charter,
a person who does not uphold the vision of accession to Pakistan
cannot stand for elections or even aspire for a job in the government.
While applying for a post in the government of Kashmir (Pakistan),
the applicant has to sign an affidavit affirming their belief
in the ideology of "Kashmir banega Pakistan"
(Kashmir will become Pakistan). Sikander Hayat ostensibly has
some powerful backing, for despite his differences with the President
of Kashmir (Pakistan), he seems unrelenting.
In
the summer of 2003, Maulana Fazlur Rehman, the head of Jamiat-ul-Ulema-e-Islam
Islami (JUI (F)), visited India. On his return, he suggested in
his press briefings that he had proposed a resolution to the Kashmir
conflict on geographical basis. This was interpreted as subtle
advocation of the Chenab Formula. It is important to note that
Maulana Fazlur Rehman was then reportedly engaged in quiet negotiations
with General Musharraf on power sharing and a role for himself
in Islamabad.
In
November 2003, Prime Minister Mir Zafarullah Khan Jamali announced
a ceasefire in preparation for the SAARC summit to be held in
Islamabad in January 2004. As frozen relations between India and
Pakistan thawed, General Musharraf announced on December 18, 2003
that he was prepared to give up Pakistan’s traditional insistence
on the UN resolutions to address the Kashmir conflict. This provoked
strong reactions from the leader of Jamaat-e-Islami AJK wing,
Abdul Rashid Turabi, who stated: “If LoC is accepted as
a permanent border, then the provinces of Punjab, Sindh and NWFP
would be deprived of water resources which is irrigating their
land and flowing from the other side of Kashmir.”
On
the eve of the SAARC summit in Islamabad beginning on January
3, 2004, General Musharraf was quoted saying that he was aware
of a dozen options to resolve the Kashmir conflict. While he did
not indicate preference for any particular formula, the media
quoted so-called sources close to the General as advocating the
Chenab Formula. It is difficult to state whether the media was
indulging in speculation or whether it was indeed, given some
serious indications.
The
peace process initiated at Islamabad in January 2004 proved to
be most sustainable. It continued despite the change of government
in India when Dr. Manmohan Singh of the Congress Party replaced
Atal Bihari Vajpayee of the Bharatiya Janata Party as the Prime
Minister, in May 2004. This period saw new heights in people-to-people
contacts such as a warm reception for the Indian cricket team,
numerous political leaders visiting Pakistan, unprecedented sojourns
of Pakistani journalists and pilgrims to Kashmir in India.
Amidst
this new bonhomie between the two countries, General Pervez Musharraf
announced on several different occasions in September-October
2004 that he had a new formula to resolve the Kashmir conflict.
It was akin to the old Dixon plan rejected by India fifty years
ago! The most striking element in the Musharraf/Dixon plan is
to treat Jammu-Kashmir-Ladakh in the Indian side as a set of five,
instead of three, regions. This would entail dividing Jammu into
sub regions roughly along the Chenab River. The President of Pakistan
did not refer to the river waters in his formula but the implications
of the division of Jammu were obvious.
General
Musharraf’s proposal in the autumn of 2004 was the first
time that a Pakistani leader came close to mentioning rivers in
public, and even then he did not cross the line of convention.
Otherwise, the reference to the role of rivers in India-Pakistan
relations has been confined to secret talks and internal debate
in Pakistan. Even academic seminars involving scholars from the
two countries rarely debate on the issue.
A
clause in the Indus Waters Treaty of 1960, signed between Pakistan
and India, explicitly prohibits linkage between the water issue
and the general position of both parties on the Kashmir issue.
Also, it is much more convenient to support the Kashmiris for
their cause than openly admit the truth that Kashmiri youth are
being sacrificed to safeguard Pakistan’s lifeline.
For
more than forty years the two countries have avoided conflict
over water despite three wars over issues pertaining to land.
It would be difficult to continue with this legacy of tolerance
and co-operation for the next decade in the times of conflict
as well as peace. If there were a war between the two countries
ostensibly on any other issue, Pakistan would finally aim to control
the river catchment areas.
On
the other hand, if the peace process initiated in January 2004
gathers momentum, it will reach its final roadblocks when the
implications for water security are considered. This is an unfortunate
reality, which must be carefully addressed from technical and
political perspectives. Otherwise, the concerns expressed by Brigadier
Pervez Musharraf at the Royal College of Defence Studies in London
in 1990 may prove to be too overwhelming for the optimism expressed
by the President of Pakistan on various occasions throughout 2004.”
Tomorrow:
The Indo-Pak Water Issue, as seen by The Final Settlement
