It is All
Downhill Now For General Musharraf Whose Power Has Peaked
By
Ayaz Amir
ISLAMABAD,
March 4: "Enlightened moderation", President Musharraf's
increasingly insistent battle cry, has only one meaning in Pakistan
today. If, suspending disbelief, you consider him God's answer
to Pakistan's problems and think him entitled to another presidential
term in 2007, you are "moderate" and "enlightened".
If,
however, you even remotely question his right to run Pakistan's
political circus according to his convenience, you deserve an
extended stay in Guantanamo Bay.
For
make no mistake, Pakistan's presidential election has started,
with everything under the sun subordinated to Gen Musharraf's
presidential ambitions. "Vote for enlightened persons in
the next elections," advised the General in Multan the other
day. By which he meant vote for people who'll vote for me in crucial
2007 when his present term expires.
Remember,
General Musharraf is president by no procedure known to the Constitution.
He pronounced himself 'elected' for a five-year term courtesy
a referendum viewed by friend and foe alike as an exercise in
hilarity, a mix of extra-constitutionalism and high comedy.
Since
that route is unlikely to be repeated, the only way out, short
of another coup, is to get elected as per the Constitution, which
means by both houses of parliament and the four provincial assemblies.
Only
problem is, how do you ensure the election of a Musharraf-friendly
legislatures in 2007? If that trick can be turned, there is no
problem. The majority of the legislators raise their strong right
arms for Musharraf and, lo and behold, he is constitutional president.
But if the outcome of the general elections is in doubt, and you
don't have much confidence in the vote-getting ability of your
fair-weather allies, you have a huge problem, requiring major
therapy on the part of Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) and Military
Intelligence (MI).
ISI
and MI have shaped the political landscape since 1999: creating
a new Muslim League, supervising, monitoring and almost dictating
the outcome of the 2000 local elections, queering the pitch for
the 2002 general elections, organizing the defection of the Patriots
from the PPP, and getting the 17th Amendment, which gives constitutional
cover to Gen Musharraf's actions, passed with the help of the
MMA's mullahs.
Can
ISI and MI pull it off again? And if both agencies have to repeat
in 2007 what they did in 2002, might not some people wonder why
the Supreme Commander, so sold on his popularity, can't fight
his elections by himself? Any authoritarian system, even a loose
one like ours, thrives on certainty not skepticism. Once questions
are asked, the ground slips from under a soldier-president's feet.
Why
are Musharraf emissaries talking "enlightened moderation"
to Benazir Bhutto and Asif Zardari? Why for that matter to Shahbaz
Sharif?
If
the lack-luster coalition of Musharraf supporters - Q League,
Gujrat Choudhries, Leghari, Patriots, MQM - could be expected
to sweep those elections, there would be no reason to hunt for
alternatives. The president and his advisers could afford to be
cool, comforted and amused by the opposition's confusion. But
if earnest efforts are on to build bridges to these two parties
not long ago denounced in the strongest possible terms, it is
because of the mounting fear that Q League and allies, the dummies
that they are, don't in the least look like winners.
The
plight of the Musharraf coalition looks all the more desperate
considering that the mullahs after being used, abused and now
discarded, seem to have lost all relish for being used again.
Or
that at least is what appearances would suggest. Sinners are predictable.
Holy men with their never-ending complexities are harder to figure
out. Qazi Hussain Ahmed would want the nation to believe he is
taking a hard line, although much of his hard line is confined
to newspaper space. Maulana Fazlur Rehman is the consummate politician,
seemingly uncompromising but in reality quite 'pragmatic'. So
who knows on which side the camel ultimately sits?
The
mullahs' problem is they are torn between the desire to teach
Musharraf a lesson and safeguard their little fiefdoms in the
Frontier and Balochistan. Wanting to run with the hare and hunt
with the hounds is the dichotomy which accounts for the misery
writ large on their faces. For this predicament, however, they
have no one to blame but themselves.
With
the mullahs out of the ambit of "enlightened moderation",
Musharraf and advisers come under greater pressure to look for
alternatives and reach out to the PPP and the PML-N, in the hope
of doing to these parties what they did to the mullahs in 2002:
taking the whole bunch of them for a ride.
So
it boils down to this: are the PPP and the PML-N willing to blacken
their faces? The PPP already has got some relief in the form of
Zardari's release, his going to Dubai and his expected return
sometime in April.
Aficionados
will also have noticed that when Asif Zardari recently re-staked
his claim to his Rockwood estate not a squeak was heard from the
official media or news sources wired to ISI and MI.
The
PPP therefore has reason to be grateful. But if it has to come
to the generalissimo's rescue in 2007, will it be satisfied with
these crumbs or will it hold out for more? If the general wants
to have his cake and eat it too, wanting Benazir's support but
insisting she herself remain out of the 2007 elections, why should
Benazir play ball?
The
same holds true for the PML-N. Although the Maulana Fazlur Rehman
faction of the party - believers in 'pragmatism' - led by Shahbaz
Sharif, and including such visionaries as Nisar Ali, seem to be
in favor of playing poker with the regime, Nawaz Sharif seems
dead opposed to the idea.
This
is not surprising given Musharraf's insistence that Nawaz cool
his heels in the Holy Land until 2010. If this is all he gets,
what incentive for him to let his party dance to Musharraf's tune?
Musharraf's
problem is that like all military saviors he believes in taking
not giving. While wanting everyone to clamber aboard his wagon
of "enlightened moderation" and hail him as Pakistan's
deliverer - and, along the way, support him in his presidential
bid - he is disinclined to concede anything worthwhile in return,
like sticking to the Constitution and tolerating a true parliamentary
democracy.
In
his dispensation, the prime minister is a figurehead. It was all
right for Jamali for whom the prime ministership, figurehead or
not, was a big elevation. It is certainly all right for Shaukat
Aziz who in Oct '99 was interviewed for the job of Finance Minister
in General Headquarters. From Citibank New York to the prime ministership
of Pakistan is a great leap forward, whichever way you look at
it.
But
can the PPP and the PML-N be satisfied with the shadow and not
the substance of power, especially when the worst of their tribulations
is over and the weather looks brighter for them than at any time
since 1999? In contrast, it is all downhill for Gen Musharraf
whose power has peaked and who from now on needs PPP and PML-N
cooperation more than these two parties need his graciousness
and support.
Common
sense and logic therefore dictate that these two parties should
stick to their guns and opt for nothing less than Musharraf's
quitting the post of Army Chief, which is the real brake on Pakistani
democracy.
But
logic often has little to do with the real or perceived political
compulsions of Pakistan's political class which, moreover, has
honed the talent of selling itself cheaply. So what is it going
to be? Bargaining for cheap benefits or, for once, sticking to
some semblance of principle? Interesting times lie ahead. - Courtesy
Daily Dawn
